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Abstract 
How big a boost to long run growth can countries expect from the ICT revolution? I use the 
results of growth accounting and the insights from a two-sector growth model to answer this 
question. The use of a two-sector rather than a one-sector model is required because of the 
very rapid rate at which the prices of ICT products have fallen in the past and are expected to 
fall in the future. According to the two-sector model, the main boost to growth comes from 
ICT use, not ICT production. Even a country which has zero ICT production can benefit via 
improving terms of trade. In the long run, the falling relative price of ICT products boosts the 
growth of GDP and consumption by inducing faster accumulation of ICT capital. I quantify 
this effect on the long run growth rate of 15 European and 4 non-European countries, using 
data from the EU KLEMS database. The ICT intensity of production (the ICT income share) 
is much lower in many European countries than it is in the United States or Sweden. 
Nevertheless the contribution to the long run growth of labour productivity stemming from 
even the current levels of ICT intensity is substantial: about half a percent per annum on 
average in the countries studied here. Eventually, the ICT revolution may diffuse more 
widely so ICT intensity may reach at least the same level as currently in the U.S. or Sweden, 
which would add a further 0.2 percentage points per annum to long run growth. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
1.1 The approach  
 
This paper introduces a method for projecting the growth of potential output and labour 
productivity, based on a two-sector model of economic growth. I use this model to make 
projections of the impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on the long 
run growth rate of 19 countries, 15 inside and four outside the European Union. The 
distinctive feature of my approach is the use of a two-sector model, in which the first sector 
produces consumer goods and non-ICT capital goods while the second sector produces ICT 
products; ICT products can also be imported. ICT products comprise here computers (and 
related equipment), software, and communications equipment. The approach is also 
distinctive in employing an open economy framework.  
There is considerable interest in policy circles in making long run projections. A number 
of workers in central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Canada and the Banque 
de France, have been interested in projecting long run (potential) output (see e.g. Cahn and 
Saint-Guilhem (2006)). The method I propose here is closest to that of Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh (2004) and (2007), who make projections for the U.S., though mine is more explicitly 
based on a growth model.  
Why should a central bank (or anyone else) be interested in potential output? The most 
obvious reason is that a central bank needs to take a view as to where the economy currently 
is in relation to its long run growth path. Growth theory tells us that in the absence of shocks 
there is a tendency for the economy to approach ever closer to its long run growth path. So 
measuring the gap between actual and long run output will assist a central bank in judging 
whether an observed increase in output is due to a shift in aggregate demand or to a shift in 
aggregate supply. A related reason for interest in long run projections is that central banks 
base their forecasts on models which include a production function. The production function 
contains a parameter which represents the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) or the 
growth rate of labour-augmenting technical progress. The work reported here can help inform 
a choice for the value of this parameter.  
                                               
1
  This paper draws on earlier, unpublished work done at the Bank of England, in 
collaboration with James Smith. Neither the Bank nor James Smith has any responsibility for 
the present paper.  
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A projection of long run output could employ a purely statistical approach. For example 
one could fit a time series model to GDP or GDP per hour to obtain projections. I have 
chosen to adopt a more structural approach, in which I attempt to explain and quantify some 
of the factors behind long run growth. I believe this approach is more helpful for policy 
makers than a black box one.  
The projections presented here are long run. They take no account of the effects of the 
current financial crisis and the recession. To do so would go well beyond the scope of the 
paper and at the moment would be excessively speculative. But arguably, the main effect of 
the recession will be on the long run level of output, rather than on its growth rate. So these 
long run projections still retain their interest, I hope.2  
The empirical basis of the present approach is the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and 
Timmer, 2009). I use this because I am interested in developing projections for the market 
sector, i.e. excluding the activities of government where output is difficult to measure. In 
practice, this means excluding the three industries labelled Public administration and defence, 
Education, and Health and Social Work. This database is also appropriate because it uses a 
common-across-countries methodology for measuring capital, including in particular ICT 
capital.  
 
1.2 The importance of ICT 
 
The approach adopted here recognises the central importance of ICT in the modern world. 
After the growth rate of U.S. labour productivity started to rise in the latter half of the 1990s, 
a number of highly influential growth accounting studies were published. These included 
Oliner and Sichel (2000) and (2002), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a) and (2000b), Stiroh 
(2002), and Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2004a, 2004b and 2007). These studies all attributed a 
high proportion of the productivity resurgence to ICT, and found that most of the 
improvement was due to the use of ICT equipment by other industries (capital deepening) 
rather than to the production of ICT equipment by the ICT industries themselves. Similar 
studies have been published for the U.K. (Oulton (2002); Oulton and Srinivasan (2005); 
Marrano et al. (2009)), and for the G7 (Schreyer (2000)); a U.S.-U.K. comparison is Basu et 
al. (2004) and an EU-U.S. comparison is van Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer (2008). These all 
                                               
2
  Perron (1989) found that the Great Depression had a permanent effect on the level of U.S. 
GDP but no effect on its long run growth rate.  
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find a very important role for ICT capital deepening in accounting for the growth of 
productivity in the different countries. It is true that some observers questioned the growth 
accounting methodology and remained sceptical of the true importance of ICT, especially in 
the light of the dotcom bust of 2000 and the subsequent U.S. recession. But the fact that U.S. 
productivity growth has continued to be rapid in the first decade of the present century and 
that ICT investment has recovered to reach levels substantially higher than at the height of 
the dotcom boom has convinced most observers, including even initial sceptics (see e.g. 
Gordon (2003)) that investment in ICT is a very important part of the story, at least as a 
proximate cause (Oliner et al. (2007)). The conclusions from growth accounting now receive 
confirmation from micro studies: see e.g. Brynjolfsson et al. (2002), Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2003), Bloom et al. (2007), and Draca et al. (2006).  
By their nature academic studies are always somewhat out of date, at least when they 
come to be published. So some more recent data is worth noting. Those who think that the 
ICT boom of the late 1990s was all irrational exuberance, associated with dotcom fever and 
Y2K hysteria, might like to note that in the U.S. the net stock of computers was 109% higher 
in 2007 than it had been in 2000, while the net stocks of software and communications 
equipment were 53% and 45% higher respectively (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Fixed Asset Tables, Table 2.2, available at www.bea.gov). The increase in the stock of 
communications equipment is particularly noteworthy given that many observers thought that 
the end of the ICT boom left the U.S. with considerable surplus capacity in fibre optic cables. 
So growth has been substantial even if at a slower rate than in the 1990s.  
It is also useful to consider ICT in historical context: how does it compare with the great 
inventions of the past (Gordon, 2000)? ICT is now frequently regarded as a general purpose 
technology or GPT, defined by Lipsey et al. (2005, page 98) as follows: ‘A GPT is a single 
generic technology, recognisable as such over its whole lifetime, that initially has much scope 
for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many uses, and to have 
many spillover effects’. Earlier examples of GPTs are steam technology and electricity. 
Steam technology is usually considered central to the Industrial Revolution. But Crafts 
(2004) argues that the impact of ICT on labour productivity in the modern era has been 
greater than that of steam in the 19th century. Using the same standard growth accounting 
methodology employed in the studies already cited, he finds that the maximal impact of 
steam technology on labour productivity growth was 0.41% per year, which occurred in the 
period 1850-1870 (his Table 8); here the “impact of steam technology” means the 
contributions of stationary steam engines, railways, and steamships via both TFP and capital 
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deepening. He points out that, at an annual rate, this is less than the estimated effect of ICT 
on U.S. labour productivity growth over 1974-90, which was 0.68% per year; the latter figure 
comes from Oliner and Sichel (2002, Table 1). Steam would look still less impressive if the 
comparison with ICT was extended to include the period since 1990. The main reason why 
steam’s impact was lower than that of ICT, at least for the periods for which comparison is 
possible, is that the rate of decline of steam’s relative price, due to faster technical progress in 
steam engines than in the rest of the economy, was quite modest for much of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
1.3 Plan of the paper 
 
Section 2 sets out the familiar one-sector (Solow) growth model and explains how it can be 
used to make projections. I then argue that this model is inappropriate for dealing with the 
effects of the ICT revolution and some of its predictions are implausible: for example the 
model predicts that a small open economy without an ICT-producing sector gets no benefit 
whatsoever from the ICT revolution despite enjoying continuously improving terms of trade. 
Moreover when calibrated using parameter values derived from a growth accounting study 
the model does not explain recent U.K. growth very well. This failure helps to motivate the 
two-sector model, introduced in section 3. The latter explains how even a small country 
which imports all of its ICT capital can still benefit from the ICT revolution. The two-sector 
model requires only a small number of parameters, most of which can be estimated from the 
EU KLEMS database, as explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents projections based on the 
two-sector model and Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Making projections with the one-sector growth model 
 
I start with the textbook, one-sector (Solow) model, augmented to include human capital. 
Consideration of this model will motivate the move to a two-sector model. Here we assume 
just one sector whose output can be used for either consumption or investment. For simplicity 
and for consistency with the two-sector model below, I assume that the production function is 
Cobb-Douglas with constant returns. In familiar notation, the equations of the model are:  
 
1[ ] , 0 1Y C I BK hHγ γ γ−= + = < <               (1) 
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and  
 K I Kδ= −ɺ                     (2) 
where B  is the level of total factor productivity (TFP), H  is hours worked, h  is the average 
level of skill (human capital) per worker, and δ  is the geometric rate of decay (depreciation). 
In per hour terms,  
 
1Yy Bh k
H
γ γ−
= =                    (3) 
putting k K H= / . Hours worked ( H ) are assumed to grow exogenously at rate n  and 
human capital at the exogenous rate hg . Treating hg  as exogenous may be justified since 
education does not form part of our definition of the market sector. Given that constant 
returns are being assumed, we also assume perfect competition in goods and input markets. 
Profit-maximisation then requires that the real user cost of capital, here r δ+ , where r  is the 
real rate of interest, should equal the marginal product of capital:  
 
Y y
r
K k
δ γ γ+ = =                    (4) 
As is well-known, this model possesses a steady state in which the output-capital ratio 
( )Y K/  is constant. Constancy of this ratio requires that the real interest rate should be 
constant too. Hence, differentiating the production function with respect to time, the steady 
state growth rate of output per hour is given by  
 
*ˆ
ˆ (1 )
1
h
h
g ky
g
µ γ γ
µ
γ
∗
= + − +
= +
−
                 (5) 
where a “hat” (^) denotes a growth rate, a star ( ∗ ) denotes the steady state, and µ  is the 
growth rate of TFP: ˆBµ = . In the basic Solow model there is only one engine of growth, the 
exogenous growth of TFP. Here there is also a second engine, the growth of human capital. 
Physical capital plays an important role, but in the long run all capital deepening (growth of 
k ) is induced by growth of TFP or growth of skill.3  
In this model, forecasting the long run growth rate of hourly labour productivity ( )y  is 
                                               
3
  The derivation assumes a Cobb-Douglas production function but this is only for 
comparability with what follows. Essentially the same results could be derived from any neo-
classical production function with purely labour-augmenting technical progress.  
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fairly straightforward: it requires just a forecast of TFP growth ( µ ), an estimate of the labour 
share, and an estimate of the growth rate of skill. Assuming that inputs are paid their marginal 
products, TFP growth can be measured by  
 
ˆˆ
K L L
Y K HB v v v h
Y K H
µ    = = − − −   
   
ɺ ɺ ɺ
             (6) 
where ( )K Lv v  is the income share of capital (labour) and 1K Lv v+ = . (In terms of the model, 
1K Lv vγ γ= , = − ). A forecast of TFP growth can be based on its own history, which 
empirically would be measured using discrete time:  
 
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln lnt t t t tK t L t L t
t t t t t
B Y K H h
v v v
B Y K H h
− − − − −
         
= − − −         
         
      (7) 
where 1
, 12K t K t K tv v v
 
 , , − 
= +  and 1 12L t L t L tv v v  , , , − = + .Similarly, a forecast of the growth of 
skill could be based on its own past history. The latter could be measured by the difference 
between the growth of hours and a quality-adjusted index of the growth of hours. In the 
quality-adjusted index each type of labour is weighted by its wage. So quality is rising if the 
composition of the labour force is shifting towards more highly paid forms of work (for U.K. 
measures of skill growth, see Bell et al. (2005); similar measures appear in the EU KLEMS 
database).  
 I have calibrated the one-sector model on U.K. data over the period 1979-2003. I find that 
the model under-predicts the actual growth rate experienced over this period and that the 
discrepancy grows over time. This is the case whether or not we assume that the U.K. 
economy was in a steady state over this period. The details are in Annex B.  
But there is a more fundamental reason why the one-sector model is inappropriate for 
studying the impact of the ICT revolution. Where does ICT appear in the solution for the 
equilibrium growth rate, equation (5)? If we applied the model to an economy with some ICT 
production, then the fact that TFP growth has been (and will probably continue to be) higher 
than in non-ICT industries will influence the past and projected future aggregate TFP growth 
rate. But suppose instead we are considering a small, open economy with no ICT production 
at all (not an unrealistic assumption). Then the one-sector model predicts zero impact from 
the ICT revolution. But surely the ability to import ICT capital at ever-declining prices must 
be beneficial to growth? As we are about to see, this is exactly what the two-sector model 
predicts.  
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3. A two–sector model4 
 
3.1 The model for a closed economy 
 
The one-sector model assumes in effect that there are no persistent changes in the relative 
prices of the myriad goods which make up a real economy. It thus fails to capture the most 
striking feature of recent economic history in the industrialised economies, namely the 
dramatic and persistent falls in the relative price of ICT investment goods. For example, in 
the United States between 1970 and 2007 the relative price of computers in terms of personal 
consumption was falling at an average rate of 20.32% per year; the relative price of the 
broader category of “information processing equipment and software” was falling at 6.44% 
per year (source: U.S. NIPAs: see Table 1). So I now consider a two-sector model in which 
the relative price of the good produced by the second sector is changing. Initially the 
economy is assumed to be closed.  
I assume that the output of the first sector can be used either for consumption ( )C  or for 
investment ( )CI ; the output of the second sector, which we can think of as the sector 
producing ICT goods, can only be used for investment ( )ICTI . For brevity, I refer to the 
sector producing consumption and non-ICT investment goods as just the consumption sector. 
The production function for this sector is given by  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 , 0 , 1, 1C CC C ICT CY B K K hHα β α β α β α β− −= < < + <         (8) 
                                               
4
  The present model draws on Oulton (2007a); see also Greenwood and Krusell (2007). A 
model similar in structure to the present one but with a quite different interpretation is in 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 5. The two-sector model with faster technical 
progress in investment goods was revived by Whelan (2001) and applied by Martin (2001) to 
study the U.S. economy and by Cette et al. (2005) to compare France and the U.S. It was also 
employed by Bakhshi and Larsen (2005) to analyse the impact of macroeconomic shocks in 
the U.K. context. Oliner and Sichel (2002) employ the steady state of a five-sector model for 
some of their projections of the U.S. economy. For earlier work on two-sector models with 
discussion of stability issues (not treated here), see Burmeister and Dobell (1970). The main 
difference between the earlier work and the present paper is the extension of the two-sector 
model to an open economy.  
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where CCK ,  
C
ICTK  are capital services of non-ICT and ICT capital respectively that are used 
by the consumption sector (here the superscript represents the industry), and CH  is hours 
worked in that sector. In per hour terms,  
 ( ) ( )1 C CCC C C ICT
C
Yy B h k k
H
α βα β− −
= =               (9) 
Here 
C
C
c
KC
C Hk =  and
C
ICT
c
KC
ICT Hk = , the capital intensities in the consumption sector. I assume as 
before that skill is growing exogenously at rate hg  and that TFP in the consumption good 
sector ( CB ) is growing at rate Cµ .  
For the ICT-producing sector, I make a crucial, simplifying assumption: the production 
function is the same as in the consumption sector, except for TFP. As a result, in equilibrium 
the capital intensities will be the same in both sectors and equal to the whole-economy input 
endowments. The production function for the ICT sector is:  
 ( ) ( )1 ICT ICTICTICT ICT C ICT
ICT
Yy B h k k
H
α βα β− −
= =             (10) 
Here 
ICT
C
ICT
KICT
C Hk =  and
ICT
ICT
ICT
KICT
ICT Hk = , the capital intensities. The growth rate of TFP in the ICT 
sector, ˆICT ICTBµ = , is assumed exogenous.  
Next, input supplies must equal demands:  
 
C ICT
C C CK K K= +                   (11) 
 
C ICT
ICT ICT ICTK K K= +                  (12) 
 C ICTH H H= +                   (13) 
The accumulation equations, where I denotes investment and where Cδ ,  ICTδ  are the 
geometric rates of depreciation, are:  
C C C CK I Kδ= −ɺ                   (14) 
 ICT ICT ICT ICTK I Kδ= −ɺ                  (15) 
Since the economy is assumed to be closed, the supply-use balance equations are:  
 C CY C I= +                    (16) 
 ICT ICTY I=                     (17) 
As before, hours worked ( H ) are assumed to grow exogenously at rate n  ( ˆH n= ) and 
human capital at the exogenous rate hg .  
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It is also useful to define the relative price of ICT goods relative to that of consumption 
goods, p : ICT Cp P P= /  where ,ICTP CP  are the nominal prices of the ICT and consumer goods 
respectively.  
 
3.2 The steady state 
 
This completes the model. As shown in Annex A, the model possesses a steady state (defined 
as a state where the real interest rate and the proportion of aggregate hours allocated to each 
sector are constant) with the following properties. The growth rate of consumption per hour 
worked ( /c C H= ) is constant in the steady state:  
 
(1 )
ˆ (1 )
C ICT
hgc
β µ βµ
α β
∗
− +
= +
− −
               (18) 
Annex A also shows that  
 
ˆ 0C ICTp µ µ= − <                   (19) 
since by assumption C ICTµ µ< . So the steady state growth rate can also be written as:  
 
ˆ
ˆ (1 )
C
h
p gc
µ β
α β
∗
−
= +
− −
                 (20) 
This second form of the solution is useful in the empirical work and also in the context of an 
open economy: see below.  
To complete the solution of the model, the steady state growth rates of output per hour in 
the two sectors are:  
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ( )ˆ ˆ
C
C ICTICT C
y c
py yc cµ µ
∗ ∗
∗ ∗∗ ∗
=
= − − = − >
             (21) 
The solutions for the growth rates of the other variables are  
 
* * *
* *
* * * * * *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
C C
ICT ICT
C ICT C C ICT ICT
k i c
k i pc
H H H n Y y n Y y n
∗
= =
= = −
= = = ; = + ; = +
          (22) 
These results are derived using the principle that the real marginal product of each type of 
capital must equal the real user cost plus the conditions required for a steady state.  
Note that in steady state:  
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(1) Output and productivity of the consumption good grow less rapidly than does output 
and productivity of the ICT good.  
(2) The stock of ICT capital grows faster than the stock of non-ICT capital.  
(3) The growth of productivity in the consumption sector depends positively on the 
growth rates of TFP in the two sectors; the weight for TFP growth rate in the ICT sector is 
the income share of ICT, β , while that for non-ICT is the complement, 1 β− .  
(4) These results enable us to show that the ratios of investment to GDP, the capital-
output ratios and the savings ratio, all in value (current price) terms, are constant in the steady 
state.  
Intuitively, where there were two engines of growth in the one-sector model, TFP and 
skills growth, there is now a third, TFP growth in the ICT sector which is faster than in the 
consumption sector. This third engine drives up the growth rate of consumption permanently.  
A Divisia index of the steady state growth rate of real GDP (Y ) can now be derived as:  
 
( )
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )
ˆ ˆ(1 )
ˆ
ˆˆ
ˆ1
(1 )
ICT C ICT ICT
ICT ICTC ICT
ICTC
C ICT
h
Y w Y w Y
w w ny y
w p Hy
w p
g n
µ β α β
α β
∗ ∗
∗ ∗∗ ∗
∗ ∗
∗
= − +
= − + +
= − +
 − + − − 
= + +
− −
           (23) 
where ( )ICT ICT C ICTw pY Y pY∗ ∗ ∗ ∗= / +  is the steady state output share of the ICT sector and we 
have made use of equations (18)-(22). The growth rate of GDP per hour is obviously 
positively related to the two TFP growth rates. It is also positively related to (a) the income 
share of ICT capital ( β ) and (b) the share of ICT output in GDP ( ICTw∗ ). It is easy to see that 
real GDP grows more rapidly than real consumption in the steady state if the ICT output 
share is greater than zero (i.e. if 0ICTw∗ > ). In fact, the steady state growth rate of 
consumption (given by equation (18)) is apparently independent of the ICT output share. But 
this is a bit misleading: the larger is the ICT income share ( β ), the larger must be the ICT 
output share ( *ICTw ), since all ICT products are by assumption produced at home. The 
relationship between the two shares is:5  
                                               
5
  The output share is: ( )ICT ICT C ICTw pY Y pY= / +  and from Annex A the income share is 
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ˆ
ˆ
ICT ICT
ICT
ICT
K
w
r p
δβ δ
 +
=  
+ − 
                (24) 
 Equation (23) is the two-sector analogue of the one-sector solution of equation (5). In 
fact, if there is no difference between the TFP growth rates in the two sectors (i.e. ˆ 0p = ), 
then the two-sector model collapses back down to the one-sector one, and equation (23), and 
also equation (18), reduces to equation (5).6  
 
3.3. The open economy 
 
In many countries the ICT-producing sector is small or even zero. So does the model set out 
above have any relevance for them? The answer is yes, but to demonstrate this we have to 
extend the closed economy model of the preceding section to incorporate international trade. 
Consider a small, open economy whose comparative advantage is in the production of the 
consumption good; it may or may not produce any ICT goods. It exports part of its output of 
consumption goods in exchange for imports of the ICT good. The price of ICT goods in 
terms of consumption goods ( p ), the terms of trade, is exogenous for this economy; we 
assume that it is falling at a constant rate.  
The supply-use balance equations must now be modified to include trade:  
 C CY C I X= + +                   (25) 
 ICT ICTY I M= −                   (26) 
where X is the quantity of exports of non-ICT products and M is the quantity of imports of 
ICT capital goods.  
The natural assumption for trade is that it must be balanced in the steady state:7  
                                                                                                                                                  
ˆ[ ] / ( )ICT ICT C ICTr p pK Y pYβ δ= + − + . In the closed economy, ICT ICTY I=  (see (15)). Equation 
(24) then follows from using (17). Hence the output share is positively related to the income 
share and this remains true in the steady state when it can be shown that the steady state 
growth rate of ICT capital is itself positively related to the parameter β  (see equations (A22), 
(A29) and (A30) in Annex A).  
6
  Interpreting 1 α β− −  in (23) as the share of labour and therefore equivalent to 1 γ−  in 
equation (5).  
7
  Alternatively we could assume that in steady state exports stand in a constant ratio to 
imports in current price terms; this would change very little.  
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* *X pM=                    (27) 
Consider a steady state in which the real interest rate and the proportions of aggregate 
hours allocated to the two sectors are constant. The “real rental price equals marginal 
product” rule implies, as shown in Annex A, exactly the same steady state growth rates as in 
the closed economy model, namely those of equations (18)-(23).  
So the open-economy model turns out to be not very different from the closed-economy 
model. The steady state growth rate of consumption is the same in both models. And with 
international trade, countries can have different growth rates of GDP per hour even though 
they have the same growth rate of consumption per hour. These results may seem paradoxical 
but they really result from our assumption of competition. ICT producers earn only normal 
profit and all the benefits of innovation accrue to consumers, even when located abroad. 
Clearly this is a simplification since successful innovation surely generates monopoly profit, 
even if only temporarily. Nevertheless it may be a reasonable simplification; otherwise it 
would be hard to explain why ICT prices have fallen so rapidly.8  
There is however one important difference between the closed and open economy 
models. As we have seen from equation (24), the ICT output share is positively related to the 
ICT income share in the closed economy but there need be no such relationship in the open 
economy: in effect international trade breaks the link between the two shares.  
Consideration of the open economy shows how misleading the one-sector model can be. 
For that model predicts that the long run growth rate of a small economy which is completely 
specialised in the non-ICT good is determined entirely by TFP growth in that sector (and the 
labour share). So such an economy apparently derives no benefit at all from the ICT 
revolution. But we now see that this economy benefits in the form of improving terms of 
trade and the two-sector model allows us to quantify this effect.  
 
 
                                               
8
  Nordhaus (2005) argues that the monopoly (Schumpeterian) profits of innovators are 
quite small in relation to GDP.  
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4. Implementing the two-sector model empirically 
 
4.1 Measuring the ICT use and ICT output effects 
 
The empirical counterpart of the theoretical equation (23), describing the steady state growth 
of GDP, can be written as follows:  
 
ln ln
ln ICTC K L ICT h H
L
B v v w p
Y g g
v
 ∆ − + ∆ ∆ = + +          (28) 
where bars over variables indicate projected values; 
ICTK
v  is the projected income share of 
ICT capital, Lv  is the projected income share of labour, and Hg  is the projected growth rate 
of hours worked. Values for these parameters are required for medium/long run projections of 
GDP growth. The parameters and their relationship to model parameters are given in Table 2.  
The scope of the present paper is a bit narrower since we are only trying to quantify the 
effect of ICT on productivity growth. We can therefore split equation (28) into an ICT and a 
non-ICT effect on aggregate productivity growth (real GDP per hour). The ICT effect can be 
further split between ICT use and ICT output, so we get:  
 
( ) ( )
Total ICT effect on productivity growth
ICT use effect + ICT output effect
ln lnICTK ICT
L
v
p w p
v
=
 
= −∆ + −∆ 
 
          (29) 
 
So to compute the ICT effect on productivity growth we need to measure just four 
parameters: the income shares of ICT capital and of labour, 
ICTK
v  and Lv , the ICT output 
share, ICTw , and the (negative) growth rate of the relative price of ICT goods, ln p∆ .  
The income and output shares can be estimated from the EU KLEMS database, which is 
an internationally comparable set of national accounts: see O’Mahony and Timmer for a full 
discussion.9 In EU KLEMS, the ICT income share is measured as profits attributable to ICT 
capital divided by current price value added in the market sector. ICT capital comprises 
                                               
9
  The database is freely available at www.euklems.net. I used the November 2009 release 
which covers the period 1970-2007 though not all years are available for all countries.  
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computers, software and communications equipment. Profits attributable to a particular type 
of ICT capital equal the rental price of that type times the real stock of that type. In turn the 
rental price equals the rate of return plus the depreciation rate minus the rate of capital gain, 
all multiplied by the asset price of that type of ICT capital (the Hall-Jorgenson formula).10 
Profits attributable to ICT capital are then the sum of profits attributable to each type. The 
market sector is defined as GDP excluding those sectors which are predominantly 
governmental or non-profit: health, education, and public administration and defence (NACE 
sectors L-N plus real estate, industry 70).11  
The ICT output share can also be derived from EU KLEMS as value added in “Electrical 
and optical equipment” (NACE industries 30-33) divided by value added in the market 
sector. Unfortunately, the definition of ICT industries does not quite correspond to that of 
ICT capital. The main difference is that software is excluded from the output definition 
(software is counted as part of “Finance and business, except real estate”). On the other hand 
on the goods side the definition of ICT output is wider than just computers and 
communications equipment. The ICT income and output shares are available for 19 countries, 
15 in the EU and four non-EU (Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States).  
 
4.2 The growth rate of the relative price of ICT ( ln p∆ )  
 
Most researchers who study the impact of ICT consider the U.S. price indices to be more 
reliable than their counterparts in other countries (Schreyer (2002), Oulton (2001); 
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003); Oulton and Srinivasan (2005)).12 I  follow suit here and 
measure the relative price of ICT as the U.S. price of ICT equipment (computers, software 
                                               
10
  In EU KLEMS the rate of return in the cost of capital formula is estimated by the ex post 
method. For a discussion of whether ex post or ex ante measures are more appropriate, see 
Oulton (2007b) and Oulton and Aznar-Rincon (2010).  
11
  The ICT income share is measured as (CAPIT x CAP)/VA where CAPIT is capital 
compensation attributable to ICT capital as a share of total capital compensation, CAP is total 
capital compensation and VA is value added, both in current prices; CAPIT, CAP and VA are 
all EU KLEMS variables.  
12
  In the U.K. the Office for National Statistics now employs a similar methodology to that 
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis to measure the price of computers, but this new 
methodology has only been applied to recent years of the computer price series.  
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and communications equipment) relative to the price of gross value added in the non-farm 
business sector (the latter being close to the EU KLEMS market sector). As Table 1 shows, 
the price of ICT equipment has fallen at a remarkably constant rate since 1970. The average 
growth rate was minus 8.28 percent per year over 1970-89 and minus 7.96 percent per year 
over 1989-2007. Within the ICT aggregate, computer prices were declining much more 
rapidly. It is possible that if the same effort were devoted to allowing for quality change in 
software and communications equipment as has been applied to computers, the rate of decline 
of software and communications equipment prices would be found to have been understated 
in Table 1. However that may be, it is also the case that over the latest period, 2000-2007, the 
rate of decline of ICT prices has slowed somewhat, to minus 6.44 percent per year, mainly 
because the rate of decline of computer prices has slowed a bit. To err on the conservative 
side in the projections, I assume that ICT relative prices will fall at 7% per annum.13  
 
 
5. Projections of the long run impact of ICT on growth 
 
5.1 The importance of ICT  
 
The importance of ICT output, measured by value added in the ICT industries as a percentage 
of value added in the market sector, varies widely across the 19 countries studied here. The 
lowest proportion is in Australia, 0.79% and the highest is in Finland, 8.21%; the U.S. lies in 
the middle of this range of countries at 3.10% (Table 3, column 1, and Chart 2).14 In many 
countries the share has been stagnant or falling since 1970 (Chart 2). This is quite consistent 
                                               
13
  Jorgenson et al. (2007) present estimates of TFP growth rates in the U.S. ICT-producing 
sector. Their low estimate is 8.05 per cent per year (based on the average growth rate for 
1973-95) and their high one is 10.77 per cent per year (based on the average growth rate for 
1995-2005). This suggests that the relative price of ICT equipment will be falling at between 
7.75 and 10.15 per cent per year. The International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 
suggests that technical progress in semiconductors, the foundation for the rapidly declining 
relative price of ICT equipment, will continue at a rapid rate over their forecast horizon 
which runs to 2024 (ITRS, 2009). 
14
  These shares are averages over the years from 2000 till the latest year available for each 
country, usually 2007 except for Canada (2004) and Japan and Slovenia (2006).  
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with the idea that the location of ICT production is determined by comparative advantage and 
may lie outside both Europe and North America.  
ICT income shares present quite a different picture: see Table 3, column 2 and Chart 1. In 
fact, the rank correlation coefficient between the ICT output and income shares is minus 0.16 
and not significant. The country with the lowest ICT income share is Ireland at 2.88%, 
despite having the second highest output share (7.21%). The leading country here is Sweden 
at 6.93% with the U.S. very close behind at 6.83% and the U.K third at 6.34%. Italy is also 
low (3.52%) as are France (4.91%) and Germany (4.45%). It is interesting that some of the 
new EU countries such as Hungary (5.08%) and the Czech Republic (4.54%) do about as 
well on this measure as France and Germany.  
Chart 1 shows the time path of the ICT income shares for individual countries, 1970-
2007. Where data are available for a sufficient number of years we see an upward trend 
though with some levelling off in most countries since 2000.  
These ICT income shares can be thought of as measures of the extent of the diffusion of 
these technologies, or more romantically, of the extent to which the ICT revolution has been 
exported around the world. Two interesting research questions are: (1) Will the ICT income 
share go on rising in the most advanced countries? And (2) will the ICT income share in the 
relatively backward countries eventually catch up with the share in the advanced ones? The 
evidence of Chart 1 suggests that the answer to the first question is a tentative no. As for the 
second question, Cette and Lopez (2008) find that the strongest factor explaining differences 
in the extent of ICT intensity across countries is the proportion of the working age population 
with some higher education. Next in importance come labour and product market rigidities. 
Differences in educational attainment may erode naturally over time. But in any case these 
factors are all amenable to policy. So catch-up would seem to depend on the success or 
otherwise of policies to raise educational attainment and reduce rigidities.  
 
5.2  ICT growth effects 
 
I now ask: what is the contribution of ICT to long run growth, assuming that each country’s 
income and output shares remain at their average levels over 2000-2007? This means 
assuming that the steady state solution of the two-sector growth model applies, after a period 
of adjustment during which the income share of ICT has risen to its long run value. The 
answer, derived by applying equation (29), is in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, and in Charts 5, 
6 and 7. Recall that I am assuming here that the relative prices of ICT products will continue 
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to fall at 7 per cent per annum. Recall too that the ICT output effect (column 3 of Table 3 and 
Chart 6) affects long run GDP (and productivity) growth but not consumption growth. The 
main findings are:  
 
1. The ICT use effect ranges from 0.28 p.p.p.a. (percentage points per annum) in 
Slovenia to 0.70 p.p.p.a. in Sweden (Chart 5).  
2. The simple cross-country average of the output effect is 0.24 p.p.p.a. and of the use 
effect is 0.54 p.p.p.a. (Chart 6). The ICT use effect is larger, often much larger, than 
the output effect for all countries except Ireland (Chart 7).  
3. The largest output effect is in Finland (0.57 p.p.p.a.) but even here the use effect is 
larger (0.67 p.p.p.a.).  
 
This means that for the average country (amongst these 19), ICT will contribute 0.54 p.p.p.a. 
to the future growth rates of consumption per hour and GDP per hour, assuming that the 
current level of ICT intensity is maintained (but not increased). This is a substantial effect 
given that from 1990 to 2007 output per hour in these countries’ market sectors has been 
growing on average at 2.55% p.a.15  
 We could also ask, what will be the effect on growth if ICT intensity (the ICT income 
share) rises to equal the level found in the most ICT-intensive country, Sweden? The answer, 
in the form of the difference between growth at each country’s own ICT income share and 
growth if the share were at the Swedish level, is in column 6 of Table 3 and Chart 8. If all 
countries enjoyed the Swedish level of ICT use, ICT would contribute 0.74 p.p.p.a. to 
growth, compared to an average of 0.54 p.p.p.a. with current ICT use levels. In other words, 
if all the other 18 countries raised their ICT use to Swedish levels they would enjoy on 
average a boost to growth of 0.20 p.p.p.a. The largest beneficiary would be Ireland with an 
extra 0.55 p.p.p.a.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Growth accounting studies have shown that the ICT revolution has been hugely important for 
productivity growth in the last twenty years or so. But without a model it is difficult to get a 
                                               
15
  The range is from 1.14 % p.a. in Spain to 5.05% p.a. in Slovenia. Source: EU KLEMS.  
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handle on likely future growth stemming from ICT. I have argued that the workhorse, one-
sector model is inappropriate for this task and moreover does not fit the facts of the past, at 
least in the U.K. But a two-sector model, in which the first sector produces consumer goods 
and non-ICT capital goods while the second sector produces ICT capital goods, does provide 
the necessary framework. Moreover it is justified theoretically by the central fact of the ICT 
revolution, the dramatic and continuing fall in the prices of ICT products.  
 According to the two-sector model, the long run effects of ICT on the growth of 
consumption and GDP per hour are captured by the ICT use effect, which depends on just 
three parameters: the income share of labour, the income share of ICT capital (profit 
attributable to ICT capital as a share of GDP), and the rate at which the relative price of ICT 
capital is declining. In addition, the growth of GDP per hour, but not of consumption per 
hour, is also affected by the ICT output effect, which depends on the share of ICT output in 
GDP and the same relative price parameter. The reason why the ICT output effect does not 
influence the long run growth of consumption is that ICT products are assumed (realistically) 
to be available through international trade even if they are not produced at home.  
 I find that the ICT use effect dominates the output effect for 18 of the 19 countries studied 
here. Assuming an ongoing 7% rate of decline in the relative price of ICT products, and that 
ICT intensity remains at current levels, then ICT use will add on average 0.54 percentage 
points per annum to the growth of consumption in future. If ICT intensity were to rise to the 
level currently found in Sweden, then ICT use would contribute 0.74 percentage points per 
annum to growth. This suggests that there is a continuing payoff to policies aimed at 
removing obstacles to the wider adoption of ICT.  
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Table 1 
Average growth rate of relative prices of ICT equipment in the United States,  
per cent per year 
 
 1970-1989 1989-2007 2000-2007 1970-2007 
Computers  -22.22 -18.30 -14.80 -20.32 
Software  -5.24 -3.49 -2.86 -4.39 
Communications equipment  -1.79 -5.16 -6.60 -3.43 
ICT (average of above)  -8.28 -7.96 -6.44 -8.12 
 
Note  ICT prices are relative to the price index of the non-farm business sector.  
Source  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts,   
Tables 5.5.4 and 1.3.4 (www.bea.gov, accessed 9 November 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Parameters required for the two-sector model 
 
Empirical 
parameter Meaning 
Model 
parameter(s) 
Lv  income share of labour in GDP  1 α β− −  
ICTK
v  income share of ICT capital in GDP  β  
ICTw  share of output of ICT sector in GDP  
*
ICTw  
ln CB∆  TFP growth rate in non ICT sector−  Cµ  
ln p∆  Growth rate of relative price of ICT goods ˆC ICT pµ µ− =  
Hg  growth rate of total hours worked  n 
hg  growth rate of average level of skill (human capital) per worker  hg  
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Table 3 
The effects of ICT on long run growth  
 
ICT output 
share 
ICT income 
share 
ICT output 
effect 
ICT use 
effect 
(a) own β 
ICT use 
effect 
 (b) Swedish 
β Difference 
Country per cent per cent p.p.p.a. p.p.p.a. p.p.p.a. p.p.p.a. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Australia 0.79 5.91 0.06 0.66 0.77 0.11 
Austria 3.15 4.25 0.22 0.46 0.76 0.29 
Belgium 1.90 6.03 0.13 0.64 0.73 0.09 
Canada 1.34 4.95 0.09 0.58 0.81 0.23 
Czech Rep. 3.81 4.54 0.27 0.53 0.81 0.28 
Denmark 2.88 6.13 0.20 0.62 0.70 0.08 
Spain 1.39 4.83 0.10 0.53 0.76 0.23 
Finland 8.21 6.14 0.57 0.67 0.76 0.09 
France 2.46 4.91 0.17 0.48 0.68 0.20 
Germany 4.75 4.45 0.33 0.44 0.68 0.24 
Hungary 6.27 5.08 0.44 0.58 0.79 0.21 
Ireland 7.24 2.88 0.51 0.39 0.94 0.55 
Italy 2.67 3.52 0.19 0.36 0.70 0.35 
Japan 5.14 5.36 0.36 0.61 0.79 0.18 
Netherlands 1.36 4.97 0.10 0.51 0.71 0.20 
Slovenia 3.97 3.09 0.28 0.28 0.62 0.35 
Sweden 3.39 6.93 0.24 0.70 0.70 0.00 
U.K. 2.26 6.34 0.16 0.60 0.66 0.06 
U.S.A. 3.10 6.83 0.22 0.70 0.71 0.01 
 
Source  Own calculations and EU KLEMS database, November 2009 release.  
Notes  ICT use and output effects calculated in accordance with equation (29). The 
relative price of ICT products is assumed to fall at 7% p.a. in future. Shares are averages over 
2000 till the latest year available which is 2007 except for Canada (2004), and Japan and 
Slovenia (2006). p.p.p.a: percentage points per annum.  
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Chart 1 
ICT income shares in the market economy (β), 19 countries, per cent  
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Chart 1, continued 
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Chart 1, continued 
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Chart 2 
ICT output shares in the market economy, 19 countries, per cent ( ICTw ) 
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Chart 2, continued 
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Chart 2, continued 
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Chart 3 
ICT income shares in the market economy (β), 19 countries, per cent 
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Chart 4 
ICT output shares in the market economy (wICT), 19 countries, per cent 
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Chart 5 
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Chart 6 
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Chart 7 
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Chart 8 
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ANNEX A 
The steady state solution of the two-sector model 
 
 
A.1 The model 
 
This Annex sets out the open economy version of the two-sector model; the closed economy 
version then appears as a special case. As explained in the text, there are two sectors 
producing non-ICT and ICT goods respectively and perfect competition prevails in goods and 
factor markets. The equations of the two-sector model for a small open economy, which 
exports non-ICT products and imports ICT capital, are as given in the text and repeated here 
for convenience. First, the production functions for the two sectors which I assume are Cobb-
Douglas and identical except for TFP:  
( ) ( )1 C CCC C C ICT
C
Yy B h k k
H
α βα β− −
= =              (A1) 
( ) ( )1 ICT ICTICTICT ICT C ICT
ICT
Yy B h k k
H
α βα β− −
= =             (A2) 
where / , , ,j ji i jk K H i j C ICT= =  are the input intensities; Y, B, h, K, H denote output, TFP, 
skill level of a labour hour, capital and hours respectively. The growth rates of TFP in the two 
sectors are assumed exogenous.  
Next, input supplies must equal demands:  
 
C ICT
C C CK K K= +                   (A3) 
 
C ICT
ICT ICT ICTK K K= +                  (A4) 
 C ICTH H H= +                   (A5) 
Aggregate hours, H, are assumed exogenous. The accumulation equations, where I denotes 
investment and δ the depreciation rate, are:  
C C C CK I Kδ= −ɺ                   (A6) 
 ICT ICT ICT ICTK I Kδ= −ɺ                  (A7) 
and the supply-use balance equations are:  
 C CY C I X= + +                   (A8) 
 ICT ICTY I M= −                   (A9) 
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where X is the quantity of exports of non-ICT products and M is the quantity of imports of 
ICT capital goods.  
Trade is assumed to be balanced in the steady state:  
 
* *X pM=                    (A10) 
Here p  is the price of ICT goods relative to that of consumption goods: ICT Cp P P= /  where  
,ICTP CP  are the nominal prices of the ICT and non-ICT goods.  
A steady state is defined as constancy of the real interest rate and constancy of the 
proportions of aggregate hours allocated to each sector (see below). It will be shown that 
these conditions imply constancy of the steady state growth rate of consumption per 
aggregate hour worked.16 
 
 
A.2 The growth rate of the relative price of ICT goods, p 
 
Given our assumption that the production functions are the same up to a scalar multiple 
                                               
16
  If the utility function takes the iso-elastic form, then constancy of the real interest rate 
implies constancy of the growth rate of consumption per hour worked and vice versa. 
Suppose the representative consumer has an inter-temporal utility function of the form 
( )( ) [ ( )] 0s t
t
V t u c s e dsρ ρ∞ − −= , >∫ , where the one-period utility function is iso-elastic: 
1[ ] ( 1) (1 )u c c θ θ−= − / − and c is consumption per hour worked, c C H= / . The consumer 
maximises ( )V t subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint that the present value of 
consumption cannot exceed initial wealth plus the present value of output of consumption 
goods: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )]s ss t r u du s t r u duCt tc s e ds a t Y s H s e ds
∞ ∞
− − − −∞ ∞∫ ∫≤ + /∫ ∫ , where ( )r t  is the real 
rate of interest and ( )a t  is assets per hour at time t. Then the first order condition states that 
(1 )( )c c rθ ρ/ = / −ɺ . So in this setup, if there exists a steady state in which consumption per 
hour grows at a constant rate, then in steady state the real interest rate r is constant too. 
Conversely, in an open economy the real interest rate may be taken as determined abroad, 
and if constant this implies a constant growth rate of consumption per hour. However the 
results here are not tied to any particular assumption about household saving behaviour or 
international capital markets.  
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(TFP), it is easy to see that  
 
ˆ 0C ICTp µ µ= − <                   (A11) 
where ˆC CBµ =  and ˆICT ICTBµ = , the TFP growth rates. This follows since we are assuming 
faster technical progress in ICT ( )ICT Cµ µ> , i.e. the relative price of ICT goods is falling. 
The simplest way to prove this last result is to use the accounting identities that the value of 
output equals returns to the inputs:  
 
i i
i i C C ICT ICT iPY R K R K WH i C ICT= + + , = ,            (A12) 
where C ICTP P,  are the output prices, C ICTR R,  are the nominal rental prices of capital, and W  
is the nominal hourly wage. Total differentiation of these equations with respect to time then 
yields the result that relative price growth equals relative TFP growth.17  
 
 
A.3 The steady state growth rates of labour productivity 
 
To find the steady state growth rates of labour productivity, first differentiate equation (A1) 
with respect to time. The growth rate of output per hour worked in the non-ICT sector is  
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ (1 ) C CC h C ICTC g k ky µ α β α β= + − − + +             (A13) 
where I have put ˆC CBµ =  and a hat (^) denotes a growth rate. Next consider the marginal 
product of non-ICT capital in the consumption sector:  
 
C C C C
C C C C
C C C C
Y y y Y
K k k K
α α∂ ∂
= = =
∂ ∂
               (A14) 
The real user cost of holding a unit of non-ICT capital in the consumption sector is given by 
Cr δ+  where r  is the real rate of return (in terms of consumption goods) and Cδ  is the 
depreciation rate on non-ICT capital. Profit-maximisation requires that the real user cost 
equal the real marginal product of non-ICT capital:  
 
C
C C
C
y
r
k
αδ+ =                    (A15) 
                                               
17
  This derivation uses the fact that the share of a given input is the same in both sectors (a) 
because competition ensures that its price is the same in both sectors and (b) because the 
input intensity is the same due to the assumption that the production functions are identical 
up to a scalar multiple. 
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Consider now a steady state where the real interest rate is constant. Since the left hand 
side of this last equation is constant, so too must be the right hand side, i.e.  
 
*ˆ
ˆ
C
CC ky
∗
=                     (A16) 
where a star (*) denotes the steady state. Now consider ICT capital employed in the 
consumption sector. According to the Hall-Jorgenson formula (abstracting from tax for 
simplicity), the real user cost of ICT capital is:  
 
ˆ ˆ
ˆ[ ( )]( ) [ ]ICT ICT C ICT C ICTr P P P P r p pδ δ+ − − / = + −  
and the real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus the growth rate of the price of 
consumption. Once again, the real user cost of capital must equal the marginal product:  
 
ˆ[ ] CICT C
ICT
y
r p p
k
δ β+ − =                 (A17) 
Consider again the steady state. We expect r  and also pˆ  to be constant (see below), but the 
relative price p itself is falling. So the left hand side is falling at rate pˆ . Hence the right hand 
side must be falling at the same rate, i.e.  
 
*ˆ
ˆˆ
C
ICTC k py
∗
− =                    (A18) 
Substituting equations (A16) and (A18) into (A13), we obtain:  
 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( )
ˆ
1
C hC C C
C
h
g py y y
p g
µ α β α β
µ β
α β
∗ ∗ ∗
= + − − + + −
−
= +
− −
           (A19) 
Analogously, note that the equality of the real marginal product of ICT capital in ICT 
production with its real user cost implies that  
 
ˆ[ ] ICT ICTICT ICT ICT
ICT ICT
y Y
r p
k K
δ β β+ − = =               (A20) 
Since the left hand side of equation (A20) is constant in steady state, we have  
 
* *ˆ
ˆ ICT ICTy k=                    (A21) 
It then also follows from (A18) that  
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ˆˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1
ˆ(1 )
1
ICT C
C
h
C
h
py y
p g p
p g
µ β
α β
µ α
α β
∗ ∗
= −
−
= + −
− −
− −
= +
− −
                (A22) 
Equations (A19) and (A22) are the solutions for the steady state growth rates of labour 
productivity.  
 
 
A.4 The steady state growth rates of output  
 
From (A16) and (A21) we have  
 
* *
ˆ ˆ
C
C CY K=                     (A23) 
 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ICT
ICT ICTY K=                    (A24) 
and from (A18) 
 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
C
C ICTY K p= +                    (A25) 
The equality of the real marginal product of non-ICT capital in ICT production with its real 
user cost implies that  
C ICT ICT
ICT ICT
C C
r y Y
p k K
δ
α α
+
= =                 (A26) 
whence  
 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ICT
ICT CY K p= −                   (A27) 
These results are not sufficient by themselves to pin down the growth rates of output. But 
we can do so by recognising that a steady state requires that the allocation of labour between 
the two sectors be constant, which implies that * *ˆ ˆ ˆC ICTH H H= = . The reason is that a rise in 
the share of aggregate hours devoted to (say) the consumption sector is not sustainable: it 
must come to an end, if only because the share cannot exceed one (when the economy is 
completely specialised). I therefore require the allocation of labour to be constant in steady 
state. Now if * *ˆ ˆ ˆC ICTH H H= = , then 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
C ICT
C C CK K K= =  and 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
C ICT
ICT ICT ICTK K K= =  since the 
input intensities must be the same in both sectors. We have then  
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* *
ˆ ˆ
ˆC CY y H= +                    (A28) 
(since * * *ˆ ˆˆC C Cy Y H= − ) where *ˆCy  is given by (A19), and by subtracting (A24) from (A23)  
 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆICT C CY Y p Y= − >                   (A29) 
Since the stocks of each type of capital are growing at the same rate in each sector, then from 
(A23) and (A24) 
 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
C C CK I Y= =                    (A30) 
 
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ICT ICT ICTK I Y= =                   (A31) 
The growth rates of exports and imports come from (A9) and (A10):  
 
* *
ˆ ˆ
ICTM Y=                     (A32) 
 
* * * *
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ICT CX M p Y p Y= + = + =                (A33) 
using (A29).  
Equations (A28)-(A33) are therefore the solutions for the steady state growth rates of the 
outputs, capital stocks, investment, exports and imports.  
 
 
A.5 The steady state growth rate of consumption 
 
We are now in a position to derive the steady state solution for consumption. By totally 
differentiating (A8) with respect to time, we find that  
 
ˆˆ ˆ ˆC
C C
IC XY C I X
Y Y Y
    
= + +    
    
 
Plugging in the steady state growth rates for CI  and X, the solution for consumption is  
 
* *ˆ ˆ
CC Y=  
And the solution for the growth rate of consumption per hour ( /c C H= ) is, using (A19),  
 
*
ˆ
ˆ
1
C
h
p
c g
µ β
α β
−
= +
− −
                 (A34) 
The existence of a steady state growth rate of consumption is therefore a consequence of the 
requirements that the real interest rate and the allocation of labour are constant.  
 
 
41 
 
A.6 Shares 
 
These results on growth rates enable us to show that the following ratios are constant in 
steady state:  
Investment shares (in value terms) ( ) ( )
Saving ratio (in value terms) ( ) ( )
Capital output ratio (in value terms) ( ) ( )
Income shares of non-ICT ca
C C ICT ICT C ICT
C ICT C ICT
C ICT C ICT
I Y pY pI Y pY
I pI Y pY
K pK Y pY
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
: / + , / +
: + / +
− : + / +
pital ICT capital and labour 1
Shares in value of output ( ) ( )
Shares of labour force
C C ICT ICT C ICT
C ICT
Y Y pY pY Y pY
H H H H
α β α β
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
, , : , , − −
: / + , / +
: / , /
  
It is not possible to solve for the steady state levels of the outputs and consumption 
without introducing more structure, e.g. household saving behaviour. However, levels are not 
required for the projections in the text.  
 The closed economy is a special case of the open economy model in which exports and 
imports are always zero. It can be seen that this does not affect the steady state solutions for 
the growth rates of output, capital and consumption. Another special case is where the 
economy is open but completely specialised on the production of the consumption good. 
Again, this has no effect on the solution for the growth rate of consumption. Finally, the 
model can be adapted to a third case where the economy is an ICT exporter: just replace X by 
M−  and vice versa in equations (A8) and (A9). Once again, the solution for the growth rate 
of consumption is unchanged.  
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ANNEX B 
Does the one-sector model fit the facts? 
 
I evaluate the adequacy of the one-sector model by seeing how well it can explain past 
growth in the U.K. The parameter values to be used in evaluating the model are derived from 
a growth accounting analysis.  
Table B1 gives a growth accounting decomposition for the U.K. market sector over 1979-
2003, based on 31 market sector industries in the Bank of England Industry Dataset (BEID).18 
The growth of labour productivity (output per hour) is explained by capital deepening (the 
growth of capital services weighted by the share of capital in GDP), the contribution of 
labour quality (an index of the growth of human skill per hour weighted by labour’s share in 
output), by reallocation, and by TFP (the residual). Capital deepening is also broken down 
into ICT capital deepening and non-ICT capital deepening.19 Capital deepening explains 
around 70% of the growth of labour productivity in our period (1979-2003). Next in 
importance comes labour quality and close behind is TFP. Since 1990, the growth rate of 
labour productivity has declined somewhat. The growth rate of TFP rose in the first half of 
the 1990s, declined in the second half, and then recovered in the first three years of the new 
century. The importance of ICT capital is clear: since 1979, it has accounted for about half of 
all capital deepening, despite the fact that even in 2003 ICT capital is only 8% of all fixed 
capital in the market sector. Its relative and absolute importance fell in the first half of the 
1990s, then rose sharply in the second half. In 1995-2000 ICT capital deepening accounted 
for 61% of the growth of labour productivity. Its importance has fallen somewhat since 2000 
but it still accounts for 38% of productivity growth, more than at any other time except 1995-
2000.  
 To evaluate the one-sector model, I assume initially that the U.K. economy was in steady 
                                               
18
  I start in 1979 rather than 1970 for two reasons. First it was a cyclical peak. Second, the 
ICT data are less reliable for the 1970s. 
19
  These results are based on those reported by Oulton and Srinivasan (2005, Table 6.1) but 
revised and updated. The main reason is that the whole economy hours series (ONS code: 
YBUS) has been heavily revised. This series derives from the Labour Force Survey and the 
grossed-up results from the latter were revised following the 2001 Census of Population 
which initially found one million fewer people than had been expected. 
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state, at least on average, over the period 1979-2003: Chart B1, panel (a) suggests that this 
assumption does not do too much violence to the data. So we start by computing what the 
growth rate would have been under this assumption. To do this we need to know the mean 
growth rate of TFP, the mean growth rate of skill, and the mean labour share: see  equation 
(5). The growth rate of TFP in the market sector was 0.54 per cent per year over this period, 
the share of labour averaged 0.581, while the growth rate of skill averaged 0.71 per cent per 
year (see Table B1). With these parameter values, the steady state growth rate is 2.00 per cent 
per year. But in fact output per hour grew at 2.76 per cent per year over 1979-2003 (see Table 
B1 again). So the one-sector model, if applied to the past and assuming a steady state, would 
have grossly understated the actual outturn. If applied to the future, the one-sector model 
would imply a massive slowdown in growth, by three quarters of a percentage point, below 
the average rate of the recent past.  
The one-sector model might be reconcilable with the data if we assumed that the 
economy was initially below its steady state path. Then capital would be predicted to grow 
more rapidly than in steady state, as indeed it did, thus allowing output also to grow more 
rapidly than in steady state. Though it might be possible to fit past data better this way, the 
one-sector model would continue to imply a slowdown in future growth. This approach can 
be tested by estimating steady state output per hour and comparing it with the actual level. 
The solution for steady state output per hour is:  
 [ ]
(1 )
1 (1 )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
h
sy t B t h t
n g
α α
α
µ
α δ
/ −
/ −∗
−
 
=  
+ + + 
          (B1) 
where s  is the ratio of investment to output, hg  is the growth rate of skill, and 
1( ) ( ) (0) exp( )hB t h t B g µα−= + , with the normalisation (0) 1h = .20 We can use this equation to 
estimate the level of steady state output per hour in the sample period and compare it with the 
actual path. The ratio of actual to steady state output per hour is given in Chart B1, panel (b). 
                                               
20
  The unknowns in equation (B1) can be quantified as follows. From the production 
function, equation (1), we can find that 1 (1 ) (1 )(0) (0) (0)B Y Kα α α/ − − / −= ,  employing the further 
normalisation (0) 1H = . In addition to the parameters already employed, we now need to 
know also the growth of hours ( n ), the depreciation rate (δ ), and the investment ratio ( s ). 
The growth of hours worked was close to zero at 0 08− . % per year (Table B1). The 
depreciation rate (δ ) was fairly constant and trendless, averaging 8.40%. The investment 
ratio ( s ) was similarly trendless, averaging 16.54%.  
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This shows that output per hour was initially about 15% below the steady state level, but 
catches up with it by 1985. However, after that it continues growing above the steady state 
rate. This is of course inconsistent with the one-sector model, which should show growth 
slowing down as the steady state is approached.  
Actually, we can be more precise than this. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas 
and the savings rate is constant (as we have seen was approximately true), then there is a 
closed form solution for the growth rate of output per hour in the one-sector model (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, chapter 1, page 53). In our notation this can be written as:  
 
(1 )( )
ˆ ( ) 1
1 1 ( )h h
y ty g n g
y t
α αµ µ
α δ
α α
− / −
∗
  
= + + + + + −  
− −    
       (B2) 
This equation can be written in discrete form as:  
 
(1 )
1
1 1
ln ( ) 1
1 1
t t
h h
t t
y yg n g
y y
α αµ µ
α δ
α α
− / −
−
∗
− −
    
 = + + + + + −  
− −      
      (B3) 
We can employ this last equation together with equation (B1) to generate the growth path 
predicted by the one-sector model for the U.K. economy to compare with the actual path over 
1970-2003: see Chart B1, panel (c). This shows that the one-sector model continues to under-
predict the actual growth rate experienced over this period and that the discrepancy grows 
over time. So the conclusion is that, whether or not we assume the economy was in a steady 
state, we cannot get the one-sector model to fit the data.  
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Table B1  
Labour productivity growth in the market sector of the U.K. economy:  
a growth accounting decomposition 
 
 1979-
2003  
1979-
1990  
1990-
1995  
1995-
2000  
2000-
2003   
Growth rates, % p.a.       
Output per hour (LP)  2.76  2.77  3.04  2.66  2.41   
Hours  -0.08  0.07  -1.47  1.07  -0.20   
      
Contributions to LP growth, % p.a.        
Capital deepening  1.93  2.01  1.63  2.25  1.65   
     ICT  0.99  0.86  0.67  1.62  0.91   
     Non-ICT  0.95  1.14  0.95  0.62  0.75   
Skill  0.42  0.37  0.70  0.36  0.20   
Reallocation  -0.13  -0.12  -0.16  -0.11  -0.17   
TFP  0.54  0.51  0.88  0.17  0.72   
      
Shares in LP growth, %       
Capital deepening  70.1  72.5  53.5  84.5  68.7   
     ICT  35.8  31.2  22.1  61.0  37.6   
     Non-ICT  34.3  41.2  31.4  23.5  31.1   
Skill  15.1  13.5  23.0  13.4  8.3   
TFP  14.8  14.1  23.5  2.1  22.9   
      
Memo items       
Income share of labour, %  58.1  58.6  57.9  56.7  58.5   
Growth of capital services per hour,  
% p.a.  
4.63  4.88  3.92  5.18  3.99   
Growth of skill, % p.a.  0.71  0.63  1.19  0.63  0.72   
 
Source  A revised version of results in Oulton and Srinivasan (2005). Data are from Bank 
of England Industry Dataset, version 3. Growth of output per hour is the sum of the 
contributions from capital, labour quality, reallocation and TFP. For details of sources and 
methods, see Oulton and Srinivasan (2005).  
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Chart B1 
How well does the one-sector model fit the U.K. economy? 
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Source: Own calculations (see text), using data from Table B1.  
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